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In this article we investigate two important aspects of disequilibrium
theory within the framework of a simple market game (Gardner [11]).
The first aspect concerns the way in which quantity demanded and quantity
supplied are equilibrated in the fix-price period. We will call this the
intra period problem (terminology by Drazen [7]). The second aspect
concerns the príce dynamics of the system. A voting mechanism is specified,
which sets prices every period. This is called the interperiod problem.
The tendency of the system to converge to the Walrasian equilibrium is
studied by means of an example under conditions of complete and incomplete
information of agents.
It can be shown that under certain circumstances the economy settles down
ín a non-Walrasian price region, due to misconceptions of the market
situation. This region may have the fixpoint property and turn out stable
for the incomplete information economy.
1. TWO-SIDED MARKETS.
In two-sided markets there are two kinds of agents, buyers and sellers,
and two goods. The medium of exchange (money) is called good 1. Good 2 is
indivisible and no agent has need of more than one unit of it. A buyer
trades good 1 for good 2; a seller trades in the opposite direction.
In advance of trading, the price p, at which any trade takes place, is
fixed.
We define the economy by
E:- {M, N. (Xi, Ni, uii), 0},
where 1E M U N, M:- {1, 2, ..., m}(- the set of sellers)
N:- {1, 2, ..., n}(~ the set of buyers)
(m is not necessarily equal to n).-a-
The commodity space is
Xi :- {(xil' xi2) E gsf I xiz
E{p,i}}
Furthermore we assume ~i to be based on a continuous utility function
Ui :(xil' x1z)
E Rt -~ S2 ,
representing the preferences of agent i.
Initial endowments are given by
wi '- (eil'
1) E R}, Ki E M
wj ;- (ejl, 0) E R~, Flj E N
The price space is formed by
~:- {(1, p)} E II22IP ~ 0}
We would have a dynamic structure, if the price space takes the form
~t -- {(S,Pt) E R2IPt ~ 0 n pt c F(Pt-1)~ ~ E T:- {1,2...}}
where F is a function describing price dynamics.
To this price space the economy Et is related
t
Et :- {M. N~ (Xi~ ~,i~ wi). Ot}
where
wi '- (eil' ei2) -(eil' 1), t E T, i E M
wt -(et , et )-(e ., 0) , t E T, j E N
j ~ 71 j2 ~1
In this way we exclude storage of goods (perishable good) by aqents and the- 3 -
use of financial assets with respect to qood 1. We will come back to the
concept of economy Et in section 6, where price dynamics come into play.
In this chapter we restrict ourselves to the examination of t)ie one-period
economy E.
One of the main advantages of this simple model is the transparent action
space of agents.
This is due to
(i) the indivisibility of good 2, and
(ii) the "satiation"-hypothesis concerning preferences with respect to
this good (i.e. no buyer needs more than one good per period) and
the "production"-hypothesis concerning the endowments of good 2
(i.e. no seller has more than one unit per period).
Consider the maximization problem of agent i in Xi, regarding ~i and the
budqet constraint. Assuming monotonicity of utility function Ui there
~
exists a price pi, for which the agent will choose one point in Xi, if
p ~ pi aná the oci~aï p,c,i;.t rn " if p' p~ (these tw~ ooints corresponding
"i i
with x2 - 0 or 1).
We call these prices pi, asking prices resp. bid prices, for sellers resp.
buyers.
Formally, asking and bid prices are defined in the following way
i E M(sellers) j E N(buyers)
(I) Max. Ui(xil, xi2)
(II) Max. Uj(xjl, x~2)
s.t. xil t pxi2 S eil t pei2
s.t. xj1 t pxj2 - ej1
xi2 E {0,1} xj2 E {0,1}- 4 -
Askinq price a(i) of seller i Bid price b(j) of buyer j is the
is the minimum of all prices, maximum of all prices such that
such that xi2 - 0 is a xj2 - 1 is a solution of program
solution of program (I) (II).
x2 Seller i E M x2 Buyer j E N
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FIGURE 1.
The impact of prices on the agent's utility can be established in the
following way. Taking Ui to be a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functionl, and baring in mind the programming problems (I) and (II) and
the definition of a(i) and b(j) we state
Ui(eil } a(i), 0) - Ui(eil, 1) ~ 0 , i E M
Uj (ejl - b(j) , 1) - Uj (e jl. 0) s 0 r j E N
which leads to
V , (p) - {
Ui(eil t p, 0) , if p~ a(i)
i ~
, otherwise ; i E M
U. (e.l - p, 1) , if p ~ b(j)
V (p) - { ~ ~
j 0 , otherwise ; j E N
EXAMPLE
Followinq BShm-Bawerk's horse market (1923) we consider the case where
good 1 is the Austrian currency and good 2 is horses. The number of
sellers is five and so is the number of buyers. Aqents are described in
terms of bid and ask prices.sellers: i i0 il i2 i3 i4
ask price a(i) 5 6 S 10 12
buyers: j j4 73 ~2 jl ~0
bid price b(j) 7 9 il 13 14
TABLE 1.
All agents are assumed to be risk-neutral, hence the indirect utility
functions aze linear in p.
Walrasian equilibrium prices 9 ~ p ~ 10, can be easily determined.
For p~ 10, the market is in excess supply, for p ~ 9 in excess demand.
For non-Walrasian p one can imagine various temporary equilibria with rationing.
Suppose p- 7.5: an equilibrium with rationing is formed by two sellers (viz.
i0 and il) and four buyers (viz. j0, jl, j2 and j3) willing to trade. It is
clear that the last will be rationed in some way.
The rationing mechanism may be related to a probability distribution which
assigns transaction probabilities to each agent on the market.
In this way we define "uniform" rationinq by transaction equiprobability for
each agent on the long side of the market, whereas each agent on the short
side of the market is sure of trade. In our example this leads to transaction
probability 1 for each seller i0, il and probability 2~4 for each buyer
j0, jl, j2 and j3.
In the sequel of this paper we will also point out non-uniform rationing
schemes.- 6 -
2. THE SHAPLEY VALUE.
A cooperative qame is a pair (T, v) consisting of the set of players T
and a characteristic function v. The Shapley value Y' is the operator on v
satisfyinq the axioms (note: 4' :- (Y'1, `Y2, .. -, Y'i, -..) ) .
AXIOM 1(symmetry) If 0 is a permutation of T,
Y' (0v) - 04' (v)
AXIOM 2 (efficiency) E `Yi(v) - v(T)
iET
AXIOM 3(additivity) `Y (vtw) - 4' (v) t 4' (w)
The Shapley value can be interpreted as a stable outcome of bargaining
(see Harsanyi [16]) or as the expected utility of playing the game
(see Roth [ 25] ) .
The former interpretation makes the connection between the Shapley value
and generalized Nash bargaining theory. The latter interpretation begins
with the fact that Y' satisfies the formula
Y'v(t) - Á~(St) - v(St`{t})]
Here SR is the set of players preceding t in a random order R on the set
of players, and t. E is the "expectation"-operator when all orders on T
are assigned equal probability. In this way, the Shapley value of a player
is the expected utility of his "marginal contribution to society", given
that he is equally likely to occupy any place in a random order. We will
relax the assumption underlying this interpretation in section 5, when
,ae derive a generalized Shapley value, whichs allows non-equiprobable
antrance for some agents in coalitions.
For games without side payments, Shapley has proposed the following exten-
sion of the value, the a-transfervalue. Consider the economy
E' -(T, (Xi, ~i, wi), ~) and the associated game (T, v).-~-
The "cardinal" approach (there is also an "ordinal" approach due to
Aumann [2]) to the problem is as follows. One specifies a utility function
for each agent a priori as part of his characteristics. In this case
utility is considered unique up to a linear affine transformation, i.e.
if ua is the utility for a, then va is also a utility for a:if and only
if va - aua t g for some numbers a, R such that a~ 0.
(ua(xa))a E T is a"cardinal" value allocation for E' if and only if
there exist non-negative numbers (aa)a E T, not all zero, such that
(~aua(xa))a E T is the Shapley value of (T, v~u), where au -(aaua)a E T~
The basic principle is to associate to E' a side payment game in which
utility is allowed to be transferable, but to consider as a solution only
those games in which the Shapley value dbes not require any t~ransfers of
utility to be made. This idea, which allows solution concepts designed for
games with transferable utility to be applied to games without transferable
utility is called "the principle of irrelevant alternatives" by Shapley.
Shapley has proved the existence of a-transfervalues. Roth [26] and
Shafer [29] raise some difficulties in interpreting the a-transfervalue
ir. the same way as the transferable utility value.
3. TWO-SIDED MARKETS AS COOPERATIVE GAMES.
In this section, two-sided markets are interpreted as cooperative games
(T, v), where T- M U N is the set of all buyers and sellers, and v is
the characteristic function to be derived. For coalition S C T, v(S)
shows the utility levels S can achieve for its members.
In the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory, the derivation of v rests on two
assumptions: fixed threat and unrestricted side payments. Here only the
first of these is satisfied, the fixed threat being refusal to trade.
The assumption that price is fixed prevents the making of side payments.
If exchange of a unit of good 2 involved a sum of money different from p,
this would mean that price was variable, not fixed. it is clear from the
normalization that for any agent t, v(t) - 0. It is equally clear that- 8 -
for any two sellers, say i and i', v(i, i') -{(ui, ui,): ui ~ 0, ui, ~ 0}
and likewise, for any two buyers. The only two-player coalitions able to
achieve a positíve result for their members must, therefore, consist of a
buyer and a seller.
Seller i is called interested if a(i) ~ p; likewise, a buyer j is
interested if p ~ b(j). An interested pair (i, j) consists of an interes-
ted buyer and an interested seller. An interested seller i is borderline
if a(i) - p; an interested buyer is borderline if b(j) - p. The above
can be summarized by saying that an interested pair can achieve a positive
result - a gain from trade - as long as neither member is borderline.
This is the basic principle behind v(S) for larger coalitions S also.
Where a(i) ~ p ~ b(j) the following holds:
v({i, j}) -{(ui, uj): ui ~ Vi(p), uj ~ Vj(p)}
To facilitate the representation of function v, we define the following
concepts. Let M(p) be the set of interested sellers and N(p) the set of
interested buyers at price p; the sets h3ve m(p) and n(p) members
respectively. For coalition S, S n M(p) is the set of interested sellers
in S; S n N(p) is the set of interested buyers in S. A trade is feasible
for S if it involves no more than k:- min {~S n M(p)~, ~S n N(p)I}
traders of each type. Let Z(S) be the set of all trades feasible for S,
and X(S) the set of corresponding utility vectors. Clearly, for any z(S)
E Z(S), u(S) E X(S) satisfies
Vi(p) , i f i trades in z(S)
u. - {
1 0 , otherwise
Vj(p) , if j trades in z(S)
u. - {
~ 0 , otherwise
Let conv X(S) be the convex hull of X(S); this corresponds to the- Q -
randomization of the various feasible trades. Then:
v(S) :- {u(S) : u(S) ~ y(S), ~ty(S) E conv X(S)}
Note that v(S) ~~, as the 0-vector, correspondinq to no-trade, is
always one of its members.
Regardinq the definitions just given we state the following theorem.
THEOREM 1 Suppose there are no borderline agents at fixed price p.
Then there is a a-transfer value such that:
(i) if m(p) ~ n(p) :
u - {m~ Vl (P) i o
, if i is interested
, otherwise
Vj(p) , if j is interested
uj-{
0
(ii) if n(p) ~ m(p) :
V (p)






, if i is interested
, otherwise
, if j is interested
, otherwise
Proof: See Gardner [ 11] , pp. 12-13.
The terms of the form m(p)~n(p) and n(p)~m(p) in the theorem correspond
to uniform rationing. Note that when m(p) - n(p), the theorem states
that the Walrasian equilibrium is a a-transfer value allocation.-lo-
4. BOHM-BAWERK'S HORSE MARKET.
In this section we consider Bóhm-Bawerk's horse market ( see also section 1)
from the standpoint of theorem 1. Given the demand and supply curves one
can compute the individual buying and selling probabilities corresponding
to uniform rationing.
Price Prob. that int. Prob. that int.











(14, ) 1 0
TABLE 2. Individual buying and selling probabilities.
For an interested buyer, this probability is simply
f (p) : - min {m~ , 1 }
, for an interested seller
g(p) :- min {mn~ , 1}
We can calculate the expected utility as a function of fixed price p,
with the use of von Neumann-Morgenstern's expected utility theorem.
We call these functions EVt(p), appraisal functions.- il -
In qeneral, a seller i's appraisal function is given by
EVi(P) - 9(P).Vi(P) } (1 - g(P)).0 -
0 , if p ~ a(i)
g(p).Vi(P) , if p ~ a(i)
and a buyer j's appraisal function is given by
EVj (P) - f (P) .Vj (P) t (1 - f (P) ) .0
- {
0 , if p ~ b(j)
- {
f(P).Vj(P) ~ if P ~ b(j)
We end this section with a remark on the structure of appraisal functions.
We define a reqime as an interval of prices on which both f(p) and q(p)
are constant. Given risk-neutrality, the appraisal function EVt(p) of
agent t is continuous on any regime, but discontinuous at boundary points
marking a change of regime.
Furthermore, on any regime, EVi(p) is an increasing function of p if i is
interested; EVj(p) is a decreasing function of p, if j is interested.
This reveals an interesting phenomenon, first noted by [20] in another,
local comparative static, context: "....assuming local unicity, an increase
of the price of one commodity near the competitive equilibrium is always
to the advantaqe of the sellers and the disadvantage of the buyers. This
suggests that the long run determination of prices should be the outcome
of a struggle between buyers and sellers in each market."
In sections 6, 7 and 8 we give an illustration of this kind of struggle,
inherent to the "Laroque-effect" and we try to model problems like un-
certainty and lack of ínformation.- 12 -
5. NON-UNIFORM RATIONING SCHEMES.
In section 3 we observed that Shapley's value leads to uniform rationing
in the economy E. This is a rather simple type of rationing and we might
ask whether individual circumstances such as personal capacity, effort or
the level of indirect utility will lead to asymmetric situations that give
raise to non-uniform rationing in E.
We are helped in achieving this goal by a recent paper of von Hohenbalken
an Levesque [19], which provides a technique for the calculation of so
called generalized Shapley values by means of "simplicial sampling".
At the outset of this section we would like to stress once more that the
equiprobability "approach" underlying the Shapley value is the one and
only reason for the result of a uniform rationing type à la Gardner [11]
in the economy E. In this way, the need for generalization to non- equi-
probability is obvious.
First, we will formulate a generalization of Shapley's value and secondly,
we will try to interpret this generalized value.
Characteristic function representation of n-person cooperative games
prevents the modelling of structural properties of a game other than the
relationship between coalition structure and the worth of the game. The
Shapley value is restricted as a solution concept to only those games
satisfyinq the condition that all coalitions of the same cardinality are
equiprobable. By contrast, Shapley's three axioms are satisfied for
Shapley-like measures based on richer characteristics of a game.
In particular, we extend the Shapley value to a class of abstract games
for which the roles that players assume are determinants of the likelihood
of particular coalitions and for which the original Shapley value can be
found as a special case.
This modification of the Shapley value ~(v, C, u) should obey the following
rules (see von Hohenbalken and Levesque [19]):- 13 -
(i) ~(v, C, u) should require only a modest amount of informa-
tion beyond the characteristic function.
(ii) ~(v, C, u) should be a true generalization of Shapley's
value, i.e. it should satisfy Shapley's three axioms and
the original Shapley value should emerge as a special case.
(iii) ~(v, C, u) should be easy to approximate computationally.
We qeneralize the notion of a game to a triple (v, C, u), where v is the
chazacteristic function, C is a paztition of the set of players N, called
a clique structure and u is a collusion parameter, a scalar. Players
belonginq to a clique C E C, C C N are postulated to have mutual affinity
(measured by 0~ a ~ 1) but not to players belonging to othez cliques.
Shapley's axiom 1 remains satisfied by our assuming that clique membership
is a property of roles, rather than of personalities of players.
j E C-r 0j E C~ , 0 E p(N), where 0 is a permutation of
players N.
(axioms 2 and 3 are implicitly used).
If the clique structure is trivial (a - 0 for every player, or C-{N},
or C-{{1}, {2}, ..., {n}} the game is essentially descibed by v and the
Shapley value emerges as a result in this special case. Thus, goal (ii)
is met.
We aim at assigning hiqher probabilities of formation to certain coalitions
(of given size); in our case the selected coalitions will be those which
contain relatively fewer incomplete cliques.
Operatinq on orders t of players, i.e. to find appropriately differentiated
probabilities pt and to apply them to
~i(v, C, u) - E PtVi(St(i)),
tET- 14 -
where t is the set of all orderings of players {1, ..., n}.
gt(i) ;- {j E Nlt(j) ~ t(i)}, t(i) is a position index
Vi(S) :- v(S) - v(S`{i})
~i(.) is the generalized Shapley value.
Now we concentrate on interpreting the "clique" and "collusion" concepts.
A foundation for a-symmetric rationing schemes is to distinguish economic
agents with respect to their indirect utility Vi(p).
This can be done by statinq a direct relation between personal utility
level and "report-speed" of interests. For instance, if
V. (p) ~ V (p) ~ 0, we assume agent
(wé supposezil, i2 are buyers):
i1 to report faster than agent i2
Ti ~ Ti , where Tj is report-speed of agent j
1 2
We suppose that agents have the same communication facilities so that
report-speed T is intersubjectively observable (in this particular case
for seller j on the short side). At this level, clique-structure and
collusion parameter come into play to determine the agent's values in the
market game.
It is straightforward that T ~ T will lead, under our assumptions to
i1 i2
clique-structure
C - {{j~ i1}, {i2}},
for seller j will be likely to trade with the agent having fastest report-
time.
The question now is: what will be the level of collusion parameter?
Generally, a E[0, 1), where ~- 0 means no collusion and uniform
rationing can be expected. The other extreme case will be a- 1, which
says: j and i are sure to trade with each other, leaving agent i2 with
empty hands.- 15 -
We believe that only in exceptional cases one of both values will be
actual. A continuous function a~ a(T) should be constructed, where report
speed directly determines the collusion paramater.
In a simple 3 person market it miqht have the following form:
(i) an ordering on {Ti, i E N} determines clique-structure,
(ii) the collusion parameter satisfies





"Report-speed" can be replaced by other results of behavior revealing
preferences of aqents.
6. DISEQUILIBRIUM IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS, THE INTERPERIOD PROBLEM.
In the previous chapter we examined the economy E in the fixprice period;
we called this the intraperiod problem. We will now focus on the (dynamic)
economy Et :- {M, N, (Xi, ~i, wi), ~t} where prices are set by some
mechanism every period. This is where price dynamics (over periods), the
interperiod problem, come into play. By means of "majoritarian" price
dynamics (see Gardner [11]) we will investigate this problem in the B6hm-
Bawerk model. It turns out that there is a strong tendency towards Wal-
rasian equilibrium-prices (this is the content of theorem 2).
The extension of this result to a large economy (see Hildenbrand [18]) is
shortly mentioned.
In section 8 we wi11 assume lack of information and adopt certain types
of "expectation". A simple example of price dynamics is examined in
Gardner's voting context.
We conclude this section with some qeneral remarks concerning the role
of information in the economy Et.- 16 -
This leads to the introduction of the concept of information INt in the
economy
EtN .- {M, N, (Xi, ~i, w~), Ot. INt}
where INt is a composite of information-data and expectations.
7. PRICE DYNAMICS IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS.
At the end of section 4 we mentioned the "Laroque-effect": in the neigh-
borhood of the current price, buyers' and sellers' interests are directly
opposed. This need no lonqer be the case, however, when price changes
are large enough to imply a change of regime. Therefore, the price
dyr.amics proposed here will be regime dynamics, and interest will focus
on whether there exist forces within the market that lead to a walrasian
regime.
We define the economy
Et :- {M, N, (Xi, ~i, wi), ~t}
where
~t :- {(1. Pt) E~2IPt ~ 0}
The function F takes pt over in the price at time t t 1, Pttl
Pttl - F(Pt) . t E T:- {0, 1, ...}
Let us remark in the first place that we are dealing with regime dynamics
in the economy and secondly, that we suppose the exact price of the next
period being drawn from a uniform probability distribution over the
regime in period t t 1.
Function F is derived by Gardner [11], by means of a voting scheme: every
interested agent has (at current price p) a vote on next period's price.- 17 -
The price regime in period t t 1 is then chosen by majority rule.
The aqent's vote on a certain regime is based on a set comparison rule
derived in Gárdenfors [10], which makes use of expected utilii:ies over
different price reqimes qiven an even chancelotterie (viz. un:-form dis-
tribution) of prices within a certain regime. This rule gives a complete
and transitive ordering of sets (i.e. regimes) to be compared by agents.
Define
A :- [ p0' pl]
g;- [ p0, pi] , Price-regimes, then:
the set A is strictly preferred to B, A R B, if and only if
pl 1 pi
1 J EV (P)dp ~~- , I EV (P)dp t
P1-p0 p t pl p0 PO 0
(for every agent t in the economy).
A regime A is ideal for agent t if t prefers A to any other regime B.
This is identical to saying that A is a maximal element in the space of
regimes, given preference R.
Given price pt in period t the process, that establishes price pt}1 in
the next period t t 1 takes the following form.
I - M(p ) U N(p ) , the set of interested agents in
t ' t t
period t (~It~
P ,- {A, B, C,
in the economy
~A~~~B~~ --...
is the set's cardinality).
.....}, the set of prevailing price regimes
Et.
the number of agents in It voting on
regime A, B, .....We state
given pt, a price Pttl
Prevails (in the next period) which is
drawn from a uniform probability distribution on that regime A,
which has the ~jority number of voters in It, i.e. the regime
chosen is
~Itl
p, s.t. ~p~ ~ 2, given preference R.
Or, simply: that regime which is ideal for a majority of interested
aqents in period t prevails ín the next period.
The underlying idea of these voting-price dynamics is that interested
aqents have a positive Shapley value i.e. positive market power in the
intraperiod market play. This takes the form of a vote on next period's
price reqíme. Models, explicitly using "personal" prices in another
context, are, among others, provided by Hahn [15] and discussed in
Drazen [17]. We will come back to this subject in section 8. For the
sake of simplicity we think of voting as a description of a more compli-
cated decision-making process.
A majority rule equilibrium, if it exists, will have very attractive
properties as the group choice. For instance, it forms a strong Nash
equilibrium of the associated voting game.
The Walrasian equilibrium ís a dynamic equilibrium in this context and
we can ask ourselves, starting from a fixed price, is the Walrasian
equilibrium a stable dynamic equilibrium?
Theorem 2 states that in the simple BBhm-Bawerk case, a two-sided market
involving horses, this is indeed true.
TFiEOREM 2:
In our example of Bdhm-Bawerk's market the majority rule price dynamics
converge to the Walrasian regime in at most two periods (except for some
extreme starting prices).Proof: is given in appendix A. It makes use of tables A.1, A.2
(i.e. average expected utility of buyers and sellers) and table
A.3 (i.e. ideal regimes). It is important to note at this point
that agent's preferences are "single-peaked"3 on the set of
regimes, so that the median voter corresponds to a majority
rule equilibrium.
To point out the generality of this convergence result of theorem 2 we
will now further examine the meaning of "single peakedness of preferences".
Going back to the forties and the early fifties, Coombs and Slack arrived
at some important results concerning majority rule. They stated the
followinq: a profile of rankings is compatible with an underlying joint
qualitative scale if and only if it satisfies a síngle peakedness con-
dition. Black related the single peakedness to some basic orderinq for
each individual. He showed that under certain conditions (viz. the number
of agents is odd and "single peaked" preferences) there is exactly one
alternative which receives a majority. Next to requirements concerning
tidividual's preferences sustaining majority rule equilibrium we point out
properties needed for equilibrium; they concern the distribution of
agents and the distribution of bid and ask prices.
We shall do this by using two simple examples ( see Gardner [llj).
EXAMPLE 1 (distribution of bid and ask prices)
Suppose that in Sóhm-Bawerk's example buyer 1 bids 3000 instead
of 30. Obviously, every seller thinks the regime (28, 300C)
ideal, so for pt ~ 21.5, we have onestep convergence to this
regime.
EXAMPLE 2(distribution of agents in the economy)
Suppose the follawing market structureTABLE 3.
4 3 2 1
2 3 7 B
Potential buyers outnumber sellers, but all are risk-neutral.
For buyers 1 and 2, the ideal regime is ( 3,7);for 3 and 4,
t
this is (2,3). Thus for any price 2 ~ p ~ 7, the system
converges in one step to the regime (3,7), instead of the
Walrasian regime (7,8).
Another claim to be made concerns the risk-posture of agents. So far we
only dealt with risk-neutral agents. It is obvious, that risk-averse
behavior will make the Walrasian regime with its certain outcome
(transaction probability is one for all interested agents) more
attractive.
The effect of risk-loving behavior is illustrated in the next example.







The Walrasian interval is (8,10).
All agents are risk-neutral except seller 1, who is risk-
loving with V1(p) -(p-5)2. A routine calculation shows one-step
convergence to (10,13) if pt ~ 10.Gardner [11] derives three assumptions to ensure a general convergence
result:
(1) all agents risk-neutral or risk-averse
(2) bid and ask prices "fairly evenly" spread
(3) a"fairly even" number of potential buyers and sellers.
In the next section we will introduce a new concept in this model.
8. INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.
If we drop the full information hypothesis, assumptions (1) -(3) might
no be sufficient to ensure convergence to the Walrasian regime. In the
model used so far the full information hypothesis is implicitly present.
It appears that "information" can be represented by knowledge of trans-
action probabilities at different prices. In the incomplete information
situation, buyers and sellers must estimate other agents' bid and ask
prices. When these estimations lead to estimated transaction probabili-
ties below the true transaction probabilities we speak of pessimistic
agents; when they are above the true probabilities we say agents are
optimistic.
We will now give a simple example of an economy with several pessimistic
agents. It is shown, that for some prices there will be no tendency to
the Walrasian price regime. The economy is then "stuck" in a non-
Walrasian price regime, due to misconceptions of agents. The example
consists of two parts:
A. We assume that a subset of one side of the market has no exact in-
formation about other agents' bid and ask prices (i.e. sellers io, ii
and i2) .B. See A., where we also assume that one buyer (i.e. j0) has no informa-
tion about other agents' prices.
We will use the example of the previous section.
CASE A.
Agents i0, il and i2 will have to estimate the prices of other agents;
we will assume, for some reason, a systematic under-estimation of these
prices, as follows
i0 il i2 i3 i4 j0 jl j2 j3 j4
a(i)~b(j) 5 6 8 10 12 14 13 11 9 7
Oi0 5 5 7 9 11 13 12 10 8 6
Oi1 4 6 7 9 11 12 10 9 8 6
4 5 8 9 11 10 9 9 7 6
TABLE 5. Expectation functions of other agents' bid and ask
prices of agents i0, i1 and i2.
The expectations about other agents' market behavior lead to estimated
transaction probabilities g, in general different from the true probabili-
ties g. A scheme of these probabilities, based on functions 0, 0. , 0.
i0 11 12
is given in TABLE 6.Price regime True tr. Estimate3 ,,,
prob. g tr.prob. gi gi gi
0 1 2
(0,4) 1 - - -
(4,5) 1 - - -
(5,6) 1 1 - -
(6,7) 1 1 1 -
(~~g) 1 1 1 -
(g~g) 1 1 1 1
(g,10) 1 3~9 2~4 1~4
(10,11) 3~4 3~5 1~4 0
(11,12) 2~4 2~5 1~5 0
(12,13) 2~5 1~5 0 0
(13,14) 1~5 0 0 0
(14, m) 0 0 0 0
TABLE 6. True and estimated transaction probabilities of aqents
i0,i1 and i2 (case A).
Agents' votes are based on the estimated transaction probabilities g,
and agent i will adopt ÉVi(p) :- g(p).Vi(p) as the criterion for the
choice of his ideal regime.
In the next table we illustrated the full information votes by "t",
and - for the relevant sellers - the incomplete information votes by "o".- 24 -













TABLE 7. Ideal regimes in the full and incomplete information case A.
We observe a tendency to vote on lower prices by sellers because of
their pessi.mistically oriented estimated transaction probabilities.
This leads to the followinq situation. At price p E(8,9) the set of
interested agents consists of i0, i1, i2 and
j0, j1, j2 and j3, which






Thus, regime (8,9) becomes a majority vote and has the fix-point
property regardíng majority rule converqence.
We will now turn to case B, where agent j0 is assumed to have the following
expectation function OjO.i0 il i2 i3 i4 ~0 ~1 ~2 ~3 ~4
a(i)~b(j) 5 6 8 10 12 14 13 11 9 7
0.
~0
5 6 8 9 11 14 12 10 7 6
TABLE 8. Expectation function of agent j0 ( case B).
The associated estimated transaction probabilities fj are given in
0
the following table.
Price regime True trans. Estimated tr.













(14, ~) 1 1
TABLE 9. True and estimated transaction probabilities of agent
j0 (case B).
We see that agent j0 has an optimistic "picture" of the market situation;
the result of this will be that he chooses (8,9) as the ideal regime,
instead of (9,10) in the complete information situation, based on true- 26 -
transaction probabilities.
However, there is a complication in this case B. Where agents i0, il and
i2 do not receive signals for p smaller than the Walrasian price that they
are wrongly estimating the market situation, so does aqent j0 for these
prices. This means that we have to postulate some type of adaption
mechanism for this agent.
A very simple one would be a"passive" adaption scheme, where the agent
accepts the observed transaction probabilities as the new (viz. true)
transaction probability for that regime, whereas he will not change
estimations regarding other regimes.
This adaptive behavior will mean that agent j0 will prefer (8,9) as the
ideal regime for every p ~ 8 and will choose (9,10) if p E(ti,9).
For the economy this leads to the following results: from every price
p0 E(6,9) there is one-step convergence to the regime (8,9).
We illustrate this in the next table.
Price reqime Interest. ag. (5,6) (6,7) (8,9) (9,10)
p0 E(6,7) 10-1' j0-4
1 1 4 1
p0 E(7,8)
i0-1; ~0-3 - 1 4 1
p0 E(8,9) 10-2' ~0-3 - 1(1) 5(4) 1(2)
TABLE 10. The voting process for prices p0 E(6,9) in the incomplete
information (B-case) situation. In brackets the situation
after adaption by agent j0.
With the help of some general definitions we will try to formulate a
converqence property for the economy E in the incomplete information case.
An agent with incomplete information will be defined having "extreme- 27 -
expectations" (a.e.e.) if the estimated transaction probabilities are such
that he will vote another ideal regime than he would do in the complete
information case.
For example, in the complete information situation agent i will prefer
(p0, pi) as the ideal reqime. Suppose we consider unitintervals where
interval (p~, pi) is such that p0 } pi } 2- p0 } pl'
Regarding the values of i's appraisal function and his estimated trans-
action probabilities g and g for regimes (p~, pi) and (p~, pi), agent j
will prefer the first regime to the second and will thus be a.e.e. if
g~~ 1 t 1 1 ~ g
Z (pitp~) - ai
We might interpret the right hand side term as a critical chance.
Of course, this regime (p~, pi) need not be the ideal reqime.
Optimistic sellers and pessimistic buyers which are a.e.e. will vote lower
ideal regimes than they would do in the complete information (we will call
them type I) and pessimistic sellers and optimistic buyers which are
a.e.e. will vote a higher ideal regime (type II).
Assuming passive adaption of estimations of agents we state the following
property:
for starting prices under the Walrasian price a certain number
of type I-agents, having low ask or high bid prices will lead to non-
walrasian price-convergence.
An analogon for starting prices above the Walrasian price can be formula-
ted for type II agents.
Not only "passive adaption", but also the fact that type-I sellers and
type-II buyers receive no signal that their conception of the market is
not right (so they will not change their ideal reqimes) is responsible- 28 -
for the convergence to the non-Walrasian regime.
As a general conclusion we can say that the presence of type-I or type-II
agents will distort majority price convergence to the Walrasian regime
for all starting prices. For a certain number of these types of agents
majority convergence to a non-Walrasian regime is present. Of course a
"certain number" should be made more precise. Maybe the large economy
framework can serve us in that direction. We observe that, though a
Walrasian price regime exists, the economy is "stuck" in a non-Walrasian
regime. This is due to misconceptions of agents about the true trans-
action probabilities.
Tilburg, March 1981.- 29 -
APPENDIX A. (Proof theorem 2).
Using the results of tables A.1-3 we give a scheme of the voting results
for different starting prices p0.
p0 (5,6) (6,7) (8,9) (9,10) (10,11) (12,13) (13,14) It
(0,5) 1 1 1 2 - - - {70-4}
(5,6) 1 1 1 3 - - - {10'70-4}
{6,7) 1 1 1 4 - - - {10-1'70-4}
(7,8) - 1 1 4 - - -
{i0-1'70-3}
(8,9) - 1 1 4 1 - - {10-2'70-3}
(9,10) - - 1 4 1 - -
{10-2'70-2}
(10,11) - - 1 4 1 1 - {10-3'70-2}
(11,12) - - - 4 1 1 - {10-3'70-1}
(12,13) - - - 4 1 1 1
{i0-4'70-1}
(13,14) - - - 3 1 1 1 {i0-4;j0}
(14, ~) - - - 2 1 1 1 {i0-4}
It is the set of interested agents, where e.g. {i0-4} means the set
{i0, il. i2, i3, i4}.
We observe three types of results, depending upon starting prices p0:
(I) One-step majority convergence to the Walrasian regime for starting
prices p0 E (6,13)
(II) One- or two-step majority convergence to the Walrasian price for
p0 E(5,6) and p0 E(13,14), because there will be no strict
majority in both cases.(III) Plurality (no majority) convergence to the Walrasian price for
p0 E(0,5) and p0 E(14, m).
Price EV. EV. EV. EV. EV. V- b. - p and
~0 71 )2 ]3 ]4 J ]
regime
~j (P0~ P1) -
(0, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 1
f (P) .[ bj- 2 (PitPO))
(5,6) 1.7 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.3
(6,7) 3.0 2.6 1.8 1.0 0.2
(7,8) 3.25 2.75 1.75 0.75 -
(8,9) 4.125 3.375 1.875 0.375 -
(9,10) 4.5 3.5 1.5 - -
(10,11) 3.5 2.5 0.5 - -
(11,12) 2.5 1.5 - - -
(12,13) 1.5 0.5 - - -
(13,14) 0.5 - - - -
(14, W) - - - - -
TABLE A.1 Appraisal function values (average on intervals} of buyers {j0-4},
Price EVi EVi EVi EVi EVi Vi - P- ai and
0 1 2 3 4
regime
~i(p0' pl) -
1 (0, 5) - - - - - g (p) .[ 2(p1tp0) - ai~
(5,6) 0.5 - - - -
(6,7) 1.5 0.5 - - -
(7,8) 2.5 1.5 - - -
(8,9) 3.5 2.5 0.5 - -
(9,10) 4.5 3.5 1.5 - -
(10,11) 4.125 3.375 1.875 0.375 -
(11,12) 3.25 2.75 1.75 0.75 -
(12,13) 3.0 2.6 1.8 1.0 0.2
(13,14) 1.7 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.3











TABLE A.3 Ideal regimes of agents in the economy.- i -
ABSTRACT
The "two-sided" market framework we discussed in this paper is extremely
simple. It rules out spillovers (between markets), which play an important
role in disequilibrium theory. Another restrictive assumption is the in-
divisibility of the good that is traded; together with the "satiation"
hypothesis it guarantees very simple supply and demand curves.
One of the main virtues of the model is the simple action (resp. strategy)
space of agents it generates. This means that price dynamics are not very
complicated to deal with (Gardner (1980)).
He observed that the Shapley value is consistent with uniform rationing
defined in a stochastic setting in two-sided markets. The reason for
this is the equiprobability assumption concerning agents entering
coalitions. Von Hohenbalken and Levesque (1978) state that this due to
the principle of "insufficient reason". They give a generalized value
~(v, C, u) that embodies information beyond the characteristic function.
It turns out that non-uniform rationinq schemes can be designed in the
two-sided market game setting; however, by using extra information, e.g.
"report-time" of buying resp. selling interests.
In the interperiod framework, convergence of prices to Walrasian
equilibrium depends upon the dispersion of relevant information over
agents in the economy. We defined a certain type of agent, having ex-
treme expectations ( A.E.E.) about other agents' bid and ask prices.
Majority covergence to the Walrasian price regime is shown to be dis-
torted when some A.E.E.'s are present. For a sufficient number of these
agents we can construct a set of prices from which majority convergence
to a non-Walrasian price regime is present.
This is due to misconceptions of agents about their true transaction
probabilities, see e.g. Hahn (1978).NOTES
1. This means the function satisfies the "expected utility hypothesis"
(see Grandmont [12]). Every linear transformation U' :- aU t B, a~ 0
has the same properties as the original function.
2. A player t is a"dummy" in the game g with characteristic function v
if v(S) - v(S `{t}) - 0, ~fS C N
3. See Luce and Raiffa [21], pp. 353-357.REFERENCES
1. ARROW, K.J. and F.H. HAHN, General Competitive Analysis, San Francisco,
Holden Day (1971).
2. AUMANN, R.J., "Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders",
Econometrica, 43, 611-646 (1975).
3. BARRO, R.J., and H.I. GROSS.MAN, "A General Disequilibrium Model of
Income and Employment", American Economic Review, 51, 82-93
(1971) .
4. BENASSY, J.P., "Neo-Keynesian Disequilibrium Theory in a Monetary
Economy", Review of Economic Studies, 42, 502-523 (1975).
5. BENASSY, J.P., "The Disequilibrium Approach to Monopolistic Price
Settinq and General Monopolistic Equilibrium", Review of
Economic Studies, 43, 69-81 (1976).
6. BOHM, V., "Disequilibrium Dynamics in a Simple Macroeconomic Model",
Journal of Economic Theory, 17, 179-199 (1978).
7. DRAZEN, A., "Recent Developments in Macroeconomic Disequilibrium
Theory", Econometrica, 48, 283-306 (1980).
8. DREZE, J.H., "Existence of an Exciiange Equilibrium under Price
Rigidities", International Economic Review, 16, 301-320 (1975).
9. GALE, D., "A Note on Conjectural Equilibria", Review of Economic
Sbidies, 45, 33-38 (1978).
10. GARDENFORS, P., "On Definitions of Manipulation of Social Choice
Functions", in: Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences
(ed. J.J. Laffont), North Holland - New York, 29-36 (1979).11. GARDNER, R., "a-Transfervalue and Fixed-Price Equilibrium in Two-
sided Markets", CEPREMAP, Paris (1980).
12. GRANDMONT, J.M., "Temporary General Equilibrium Theory", Econometrica,
45, 535-572 (1977).
13. GRANDMONT, J.M., "The Logic of Fix-Price Method", Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 79, 169-186 (1977).
14. GRANDMONT, J.M., and G. LAROQUE, "On Temporary Keynesian Equilibria",
Review of Economic Studies, 43, 53-67 (1976).
15. AAHN, F.A., "On Non-Walrasian Equilibria", Review of Eccnomic Studies,
45, 1-17 (1978).
16. HARSANYI, J.C., "Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in
Games and Social Situations", Cambridge University Press. (1977).
17. HEUVEL, P.v.d., "Disequilibria in a Macroeconomic Model", COSOR-
memorandum 79-02, Eindhoven University of Technology (1979).
18. AILDENBRAND, W., "Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy", Princeton
University Press (1974).
19. AOHENBALKEN, B. von, and LEVESQUE, T. "Generali2ed Shapley Values by
Simplicial Sampling", Working Paper IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
(1978) .
20. LAROQUE, G., "The Fixed-Price Equilibria: Some Results in Local
Comparative Statics", Econometrics, 46, 1127-1154 (1978).
21. LUCE. R.D., RAIFFA A., "Games and Decisions", Wíley (1957).
22. MALINVAUD, E., "The Theory of Unemployment Reconsidered", Basil
Blackwell (1977).23. NEUMANN, J. von, and O. MORGENSTERN, "The Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior", Princeton University Press (1947).
24. RAPOPORT, An., "N-Person Game Theory: Concepts and Applications",
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (1970).
25. ROTH, A.E., "The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-MOrgenstern Utility",
Econometrica, 45, 657-669 (1977).
26. ROTH, A.E., "Values for Games Without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties
with Current Concepts", Econometríca, 48, 457-465 (1980).
27. RUYS, P.H.M., "Disequilibrium Charactezized by Implicit Prices in
Terms of Effort", Research Memorandum Tilburq University
(1980).
28. RUYS, P.H.M., and H.N. WEDDEPOHL, "Cursus Wiskundige Economie,
deel I", Tilburg University (1980).
29. SHAFER, W., "On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation",
Econometrica, 48, 467-476 (1980).
30. SHAPLEY, L.S., "A value for n-Person Games", in: H.W. Kuhn and
A.W. Tucker, Contributions of the Theory of Games, II,
307-317 (1953).
31. WEINTRAUB, E.R., "The Microfoundations of Macroeconomics: A Critical
Survey", Journal of Economic Literature, 15, 1-23 (1977).qIII~VÍ~VVYN~ I1~ÍNmNV~VII' i